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We study an NGO’s decisions when it attempts to remove a potentially hazardous substance from commercial
use in a market with competing firms. Specifically, we determine under what market and regulatory conditions an
NGO should target the industry versus the regulatory body in order to influence firms to replace the substance.
We examine how the NGO’s strategy changes as the NGO’s pragmatism (i.e., the extent to which the NGO
incorporates firms’ profits into its decision making) increases. Our results demonstrate that when the NGO is
less pragmatic, it should examine the existing market structure to determine whether to target the industry or
the regulatory body. However, as the pragmatism of the NGO increases, the NGO should increasingly leverage
the competition between firms to ensure that a replacement is available to consumers. We examine multiple
extensions including varying the competition dynamics, the NGO targeting both the industry and the regulatory
body, the time discounting of replacement costs, and a firm potentially lobbying to counteract an NGO’s activism.
We show that the ability of a firm to lobby can benefit consumers by motivating the NGO to exert more effort
and increase the market sensitivity to a substance, thereby forcing the firm to replace.
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1. Introduction
Recently, the uncertain environmental and health impacts of consumer products and the chemicals they
contain have been a popular topic in the news. Articles and studies have been released on a wide range
of substances and products such as bisphenol-A (BPA) in food containers (Freinkel 2012), triclosan in
soaps and toothpastes (Layton 2010), and phthalates in fashion goods (Pous 2012). Although all of
these substances are of high concern for consumers, governments, corporations, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), none have been definitively proven as harmful. When an unregulated substance
or chemical is identified as potentially hazardous, it invokes consumer fears, scientific debate, and
as a result, difficult decisions for both firms and NGOs. Firms must choose whether to replace the
substance in light of rising consumer concerns, high replacement costs, and uncertain regulatory and
substance risks. At the same time, an NGO interested in compelling firms to remove the substance
from commercial use must decide where to direct its resources. Should it directly target the industry
to increase the market sensitivity to the substance, or should it petition governmental organizations
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to increase the likelihood of regulation? In this paper, we investigate who an NGO should target, the
industry or the regulatory body, in order to influence firms to replace a potentially hazardous substance.
An NGO’s strategy for removing a potentially hazardous substance from commercial use is compli-
cated by the level of consumer sensitivity to the substance and uncertainty regarding the substance
risk and regulation. Consequently, how an NGO should direct its effort can vary depending on the
scenario. Consider the following strategies. To increase the likelihood of either regulation banning the
substance or firms replacing the substance in anticipation of regulation, an NGO can target the regu-
latory body. For example, since its formation in 2007, the European Union’s Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) directive for monitoring and detecting poten-
tially harmful chemicals has been criticized for not being aggressive enough in identifying substances
of very high concern (SVHC). As a result, an NGO called ChemSec established The SIN (Substitute It
Now!) List to “[accelerate] the REACH legislative process” and to identify additional SVHC (The SIN
List 2012). Alternatively, by acting on consumer fears and firms’ concerns over corporate image and
market share, an NGO can directly target an industry to force firms to replace a substance. As Paul
Gilding, former head of Greenpeace, noted, “smart activists are now saying, ‘O.K., you want to play
markets – let’s play’” (Friedman 2001). For example, in the spring of 2010, Greenpeace held protests
at the corporate headquarters of Samsung for what Greenpeace felt were “broken promises” by the
company to remove potentially hazardous substances from its product lines (Williams 2010).
In this setting, NGOs are not the only decision makers. When a substance within a firm’s products
is identified as potentially hazardous, a firm must make difficult decisions while managing both costs
and risks. A firm’s cost to remove a substance from its products can be substantial. For example,
the Consumer Electronics Association estimates that the initial compliance requirements for the EU’s
Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) directive, which restricts the use of only six substances,
cost the global electronics industry $32 billion (Carbone 2008). New directives such as REACH and
accompanying NGO initiatives such as The SIN List, guarantee there will be many more substances
of concern for firms to manage in the future. However, regulation and costs are not the only threats
firms face. Consumers today are more sensitive to the potential dangers, whether real or perceived,
of the products they buy and use. As a result, a potentially hazardous substance can represent both
an opportunity and a risk for a firm. For example, in the plastic baby bottle market, when BPA first
became a substance of concern for consumers, many larger firms did not have a BPA-free alternative.
As the sales of BPA-free baby bottles increased five-fold at some retailers, a niche market opportunity
emerged for smaller firms with a BPA-free product (IEHN 2008, Kuchment 2008). Finally, a firm may
not believe that a substance is harmful. As a result, a firm may choose to lobby either the regulatory
body or consumers to counteract negative sentiment towards a substance. For example, the leading
producers of brominated flame retardants (BFRs) in the U.S. mounted both consumer campaigns and
political lobbying in an attempt to highlight the safety benefits of BFRs (Callahan and Roe 2012).
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In this paper, we consider a competition-based model, in which two firms sell a product containing a
potentially hazardous substance. Although the substance is not regulated, an NGO exists that would
like to influence the firms to replace the substance. How much an NGO should consider firms’ well-being
when devising its strategy is a current debate within the environmental movement (The Economist
2010). To capture this aspect, we define an NGO’s pragmatism as the extent to which it incorporates
firms’ profits into its decision making; we examine how the NGO’s strategy changes as its pragmatism
increases. Our goal is to determine when an NGO should target the industry versus the regulatory
body, based on market structure, potential environmental benefit, and NGO pragmatism. This research
is directed towards NGOs active in the chemicals space (e.g., ChemSec, Environmental Defense Fund,
and Greenpeace) and companies interested in learning more about an NGO’s perspective. In today’s
technology-driven world, given the scale and speed with which activists can launch campaigns (Soule
2009), understanding secondary stakeholders’ motivations and strategies is critical for a firm.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analytically study an activist’s strategic choice
of where to allocate its resources under different market and regulatory conditions. Our results show
that there is an important interplay between the NGO’s pragmatism and the NGO’s optimal strategic
choice. For example, if the NGO does not significantly consider firms’ well-being in its decision making,
then the NGO’s goal is solely to maximize the number of consumers receiving a replacement. Thus,
the NGO’s strategy should be to induce all firms or at least a dominant firm to replace by any means
necessary. Whether or not the NGO should target the industry or the regulatory body to do so is
driven by the market structure. In contrast, unless the market consists of similar-sized firms and the
benefit from replacement is very high or very low, a more pragmatic NGO should target the industry
and leverage the competition between firms to ensure that a replacement is available to consumers.
We also examine how varying the competition dynamics, the option to target both the industry and
the regulatory body, the time discounting of replacement costs, and the ability of a firm to lobby to
offset the NGO’s activism impact the NGO’s optimal strategy. For example, we show that a firm’s
ability to lobby can benefit consumers because the NGO may respond by increasing its effort, thereby
increasing the market sensitivity to the substance and forcing the firm to replace.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we review the relevant literature and in
§3 we introduce the base model formulation. We present our findings regarding the NGO’s optimal
strategy in §4 and discuss extensions to our base model in §5. In §6 we analyze how the potential for a
firm to lobby can impact the NGO’s strategy. In §7 we highlight our insights and conclude the paper.
2. Literature Review
Next, we discuss the literature relevant to the NGO’s decisions. Note that our work also relates to the
emerging literature on analytical modeling of firms’ environmental investment decisions (e.g., Cortazar
et al. 1998, Fisher 2000, Kraft et al. 2012), environmental regulation and operations management (e.g.,
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Atasu et al. 2009, Chen 2001, Plambeck and Wang 2009), and nonprofit operations management (e.g.,
DeVericourt and Lobo 2009, Privett and Erhun 2011).
Public versus Private Politics: Within the political economy literature, how activists influence
corporations can be classified into two broad categories: public politics and private politics. Public
politics studies how activists can advance their agendas through petitioning government and regulatory
bodies. While it is frequently used, influencing firms through public politics can be time-consuming
and costly for activists (see Lyon and Maxwell (2004) for an overview of the traditional public policy
life cycle). As such, there is a growing interest in private politics among activists and academics.
Private politics examines how activists can directly target firms, bypassing the need for regulation or
government interaction. Within the literature, Baron (2001, 2003) introduced the concept of private
politics by studying how activists can compel firms to act and what are firms’ optimal strategic
responses to activists’ campaigns. Our interests are at the intersection of public and private politics,
as there is a lack of research that considers both strategy types (Baron 2011, Soule 2009). Although
Calveras et al. (2007) and Reid and Toffel (2009) study both private and public politics, neither work
examines the strategic choice of one method over the other. We add to the literature by analyzing when
an NGO should target the industry (private politics) versus the regulatory body (public politics).
NGO Pragmatism: Within the environmental literature, there is a growing opinion that a division
is forming among activists (Dowie 1996, Schwartz and Paul 1992, Speth 2008). Conner and Epstein
(2007) divide their study of NGOs into two broad categories: purists, who typically seek change through
confrontation, and pragmatists, who instead prefer to work with firms to solve environmental problems.
Hoffman (2009) disagrees with this classification, stating that although most scholars classify environ-
mental NGOs into two camps, “dark greens” and “bright greens,” there is actually a wide variety of
environmental NGOs and thus, “shades of green.” Studying whether an NGO should collaborate or
confront firms is beyond the scope of our analysis as it requires a deeper understanding of an NGO’s
philosophy and donor base. However, based on our discussions with academic and NGO leaders, we rec-
ognize the importance of capturing the differences that can exist between NGOs’ philosophies. Hence,
we define the pragmatism of the NGO as the extent to which the NGO incorporates firms’ profits into
its objective function, with the NGO’s pragmatism taking a continuum of potential values.
Modeling an NGO’s Objective Function: Defining a nonprofit’s objective can be difficult
because a nonprofit may have multiple or conflicting goals (Steinberg 1986, Weisbrod 1998). Within
the nonprofit literature, the nonprofit’s objective function is often modeled as a linear combination
of different objectives (Harrison and Lybecker 2005, Liu and Weinberg 2004, Steinberg 1986). For
example, Harrison and Lybecker (2005) model a nonprofit hospital’s objective function as a linear
combination of the hospital’s profit and motive (e.g., quality of care) minus the hospital’s cost. Con-
versely, within the political economy and strategy literature, activists’ objective functions are often
modeled around a single goal (Baron 2001, Baron and Diermeier 2007, Lenox and Eesley 2009). For
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example, Baron (2001) examines how an activist can use boycotts to influence a firm to reduce its
pollution levels. The activist’s objective is to minimize the expected level of pollution and its cost of
effort to boycott. We combine these approaches, defining the NGO’s objective as a linear combination
of environmental benefit and firms’ profits, minus the NGO’s cost of effort to target either the industry
or the regulatory body. Note that we do not directly model the revenue the NGO earns from donations.
Instead, we assume that our modeling of environmental benefit implicitly reflects donor satisfaction
with the NGO. We discuss this assumption in more detail in §7.
3. The Model
We analyze a setting in which two firms, with market share percentages θ1 and θ2, sell a product
containing a potentially hazardous substance. Hereafter, references to firm size (i.e., large or small) are
with respect to market share. The two firms represent the entire market (i.e., θ1 +θ2 = 1 with θ1 ≥ θ2),
and M represents the total market size in terms of revenue; Table 1 summarizes our notation. There
exists an NGO that would like to remove the substance from the market. Although the substance is
not regulated, there is a belief among the firms and the NGO that regulation may occur. The sequence
of events is as follows: (i) The NGO determines who to target, the industry or the regulatory body, and
the level of effort  to exert. (ii) The two firms decide simultaneously whether to immediately replace
the substance at cost K(θi) or to defer replacement. (iii) Regulation occurs with probability r(); if
regulation occurs and a firm has not replaced the substance, then the firm is forced to replace. The firms
must decide whether to proactively replace or to defer replacement and wait to see if regulation happens.
Note that deferring replacement is a viable option since not all potentially hazardous substances are
proven to be harmful (e.g., aspartame in diet soft drinks; see Brody 1983, Halliday 2008).
By compelling firms to replace the substance, either by targeting the industry or the regulatory
body, the NGO reduces the number of consumers exposed to the substance. Depending on the NGO’s
strategy, the effort level  the NGO exerts affects either the proportion of the market sensitive to the
substance and preferring a product with a replacement substance, ξ(), or the likelihood of regulation,
r(). The notation x() denotes the impact of the NGO’s effort on ξ() and r(). In our base model,
we consider a linear impact (i.e., x() = ); in §5 we relax this assumption.
Once the NGO determines whom to target and the corresponding effort level, the two firms then
compete in a static game of complete information; i.e., they make their own replacement decisions
simultaneously without observing the other’s action. Firm i’s strategy si is either to replace the sub-
stance at cost K(θi) or to defer replacement (D) and wait to see if regulation occurs. The first row
in each cell of Table 2 shows the payoff for the large firm and the second row shows the payoff for
the small firm given the strategy profile. We assume that the replacement cost K(θi) is concave and
increasing in θi. Hence, a large-market-share firm incurs a higher total replacement cost than a small-
market-share firm, but the average cost (i.e., K(θi)/θi) is lower for the large firm due to economies
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Table 1 Notation
NGO Parameters
b Marginal environmental benefit to consumers if the substance is replaced; b > 0
γ The level of NGO pragmatism with a larger value implying the NGO is more pragmatic and thus, more concerned
with firms’ profits; γ ∈ [0,1]
c Cost factor associated with the NGO’s effort level; c > 0
 Effort level exerted by the NGO; ∈ [0,1]
NS Optimal effort level exerted by the NGO under NGO strategy N (targeting the industry or the regulatory body)
to induce firm replacement equilibrium S; NS ∈ [0,1]
piNS NGO’s payoff given effort level 
N
S under NGO strategy N and firm replacement equilibrium S
Firm Parameters
θi Market share percentage of firm i∈ {1,2}; θ1 + θ2 = 1 with θ1 ≥ θ2, −i denotes firm i’s competitor
K(θi) Firm i’s cost to immediately replace the substance; K(θi) is concave and increasing in θi
si Firm i’s strategy; si∈{K(θi) (replace), D (defer replacement)}; s∗i () is firm i’s equilibrium strategy given 
Market and Regulation Parameters
M Total market size in terms of revenue
x() Impact of the NGO’s effort level on either the final percentage of the market sensitive to the substance or the
final probability of regulation
q Existing percentage of the market sensitive to the substance before the NGO exerts any effort; q ∈ [0,1]
ξ() Final percentage of the market sensitive to the substance; if the NGO targets the industry, then ξ() = q+ (1−
q)x(), otherwise ξ() = q
p Existing probability of regulation before the NGO exerts any effort; p∈ [0,1]
r() Final probability of regulation; if the NGO targets the regulatory body, then r() = p+ (1− p)x(), otherwise
r() = p
α Regulation penalty; α≥ 1
of scale. We also assume that a firm’s replacement cost is based on its initial market share. Although
the cost to develop a replacement substance may be independent of firm size, the cost to implement
a replacement is typically increasing in firm size due to large firms’ high existing inventory costs and
complex supply chains. For example, the average cost of compliance for RoHS was $6.5 million for
companies with sales greater than $1 billion, and $2.9 million for companies with sales between $100
million and $1 billion, with a large portion of the firms’ replacement costs due to modifying current
operations and writing off existing inventory (Carbone 2008).








Mθ1−Mθ1ξ()− r()αK(θ1) Mθ1−Mθ1ξ()− r()αK(θ1)
Mθ2 +Mθ1ξ()−K(θ2) Mθ2−Mθ2ξ()− r()αK(θ2)
Note: If the NGO targets the industry, then ξ() = q+ (1− q)x() and r() = p. If the NGO
targets the regulatory body, then r() = p+ (1− p)x() and ξ() = q.
If the NGO targets the industry, then the NGO’s effort impacts the percentage of the market sensitive
to the substance and thus preferring to switch to a product with a replacement substance. We model
the resulting market sensitivity as ξ() = q + (1 − q)x(), where q is the existing percentage of the
market sensitive to the substance and (1− q)x() is the increase in the market sensitivity caused by
Kraft, Zheng, and Erhun: The NGO’s Dilemma 7
the NGO’s effort. If instead, the NGO targets the regulatory body, then the NGO’s effort no longer
affects the market sensitivity to the substance and ξ() = q. The portion of firm i’s market share that
is sensitive to the substance is then given by Mθiξ(). If firm i replaces the substance but firm -i does
not, instead choosing to wait to see if regulation occurs, then firm i incurs market share gain Mθ−iξ()
for being the first to replace and firm -i incurs market share loss Mθ−iξ(). When both firms replace,
there is no shift in market share between the firms. When both firms defer replacement, then both
firms lose market share as sensitive consumers leave the market.
After the firms make their decisions, regulation of the substance is announced with probability
r(). If the NGO targets the regulatory body, then the final probability of regulation takes the form
r() = p+ (1−p)x(). Here p is the existing probability of regulation before the NGO exerts any effort
and (1− p)x() is the increase in the probability of regulation caused by the NGO’s effort. If instead,
the NGO targets the industry, then the final probability of regulation is no longer affected by the
NGO’s effort and r() = p. If regulation occurs and firm i has not yet replaced the substance, then it is
forced to replace at cost αK(θi) with α≥ 1. This cost represents the penalty a firm incurs for not having
devoted enough time towards developing and implementing a replacement throughout its product lines.
As Mark Newton, Dell’s senior manager for environmental sustainability, noted, “Being ahead of the
curve on regulation indicates overall good management. Late adaptation has cost implications, for
example the cost of making major changes in a very limited time frame” (ChemSec 2009).
The NGO’s objective is to maximize the net benefit of influencing firms to replace the substance.
In particular, the NGO’s decisions are driven by the environmental benefit gained from replacement,
potentially the firms’ profits (depending on the NGO’s pragmatism), and the cost to campaign against
the industry or the regulatory body. We broadly define environmental benefit to mean the environment
or health benefit consumers receive from a replacement substance. We measure environmental benefit
as bg(θ1, θ2, ), where b is the marginal environmental benefit to consumers if a substance is replaced
and g(θ1, θ2, ) is the expected percentage of the market that receives a replacement substance:
g(θ1, θ2, ) =

θ1 + θ2 = 1 if s1 =K(θ1) and s2 =K(θ2),
(1− r())(θi + θ−iξ()) + r() if si =K(θi) and s−i =D,
r()(1− ξ())(θ1 + θ2) = r()(1− ξ()) if s1 =D and s2 =D.
(1)
As discussed earlier, the values of ξ() and r() depend on the NGO’s strategy. We assume that
consumers make their product choice before the regulation outcome is realized. Thus, if both firms
defer, then sensitive consumers leave the market and do not return, even if regulation eventually occurs.
We are interested in how an NGO’s philosophy towards firms can alter its strategy for influencing
firms’ replacement decisions. We define γ ∈ [0,1] as a measure of the NGO’s pragmatism. If γ = 0, then
the NGO is only concerned with the environmental benefit. As γ increases, the NGO becomes more
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pragmatic and includes the firms’ profits into its objective function. We denote the extent to which
the NGO considers the firms’ profits as γh(θ1, θ2, ), where h(θ1, θ2, ) is the total profit of both firms:
h(θ1, θ2, ) =

M −K(θ1)−K(θ2) if s1 =K(θ1) and s2 =K(θ2),
M −K(θi)− r()αK(θ−i) if si =K(θi) and s−i =D,
M − r()αK(θ1)− r()αK(θ2) if s1 =D and s2 =D.
(2)
Similar to Equation (1), the value of r() depends on the NGO’s strategy.
The NGO’s payoff function is then given by
piNGO() = bg(θ1, θ2, ) + γh(θ1, θ2, )− c2, (3)
where c2 is the NGO’s cost as a function of the exerted effort level and c is the NGO’s cost factor.
Next, we examine the NGO’s optimal strategy for influencing firms to replace a potentially hazardous
substance. To analyze our setting, we theoretically characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
solving for the NGO’s optimal effort and the firms’ equilibrium replacement strategies; the detailed
analysis is deferred to Appendix A. All proofs are available from the authors upon request. We also
conduct an extensive numerical analysis with the following parameter set: M = 500, K(θi) = k
√
θi
with k ∈ {225,300,375,450}, θ1 ∈ [0.55,0.95] with an increment of 0.01, b ∈ [1,700] with an increment
of 7, c = 100, γ ∈ [0,1] with an increment of 0.25, p ∈ [0.025,0.525] with an increment of 0.025, q ∈
[0.025,0.525] with an increment of 0.025, and α∈ [0.50,3.00] with an increment of 0.25. We discuss the
details of all numerical results in Appendix C. Results found in the appendix and the online appendix
are referenced as A.x and O.x here. To simplify notation, hereafter we use Ki to denote K(θi).
4. Should the NGO Target the Industry or the Regulatory Body?
In this section, we answer our primary research question: Under what conditions should the NGO target
the industry versus the regulatory body? Observe that due to the existing regulatory environment and
market sensitivity, NGO activism may not always be necessary to induce firms to replace a potentially
hazardous substance. Given the concavity of the firms’ replacement costs with respect to market share,
the average replacement cost per dollar of revenue is higher for the small firm (i.e.,K2/θ2 >K1/θ1). This
implies that the small firm has less incentive to proactively replace. Hence, if the existing regulatory
and market conditions are such that the small firm proactively replaces (i.e., K2 ≤ αpK2+Mθ2q), then
both firms will replace even if the NGO exerts no effort (Lemma A.4).
Our analysis will focus on scenarios in which K2 > αpK2 + Mθ2q; that is, neither the existing
regulatory threat nor the existing market sensitivity to the substance is large enough to induce both
firms to proactively replace. Hence, the NGO must take action to induce firms to proactively replace.
Figure 1, which is referenced throughout §4, illustrates the NGO’s optimal strategy (target the Industry
or the Regulatory body) and the resulting firm replacement equilibrium when γ > 0 and γ = 0. We
characterize the equilibria with respect to two values: the ratio of the marginal environmental benefit
to the NGO’s cost factor (b/c) and the market share of the large firm (θ1). This allows us to compare
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high versus low benefit-to-cost scenarios, with either a homogeneous (θ1 close to 0.5) or a dominant-
firm (θ1 close to 1) market structure. We present two figures, γ > 0 and γ = 0, to highlight the impact
of the NGO’s pragmatism on its optimal strategy. We define piNS as the NGO’s payoff given the optimal
effort level NS under NGO strategy N , when firm replacement equilibrium S is induced. Table A.3
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(b) γ = 0
Figure 1 Equilibria Under the NGO’s Optimal Strategy - Target Industry or Regulation
Note: We define b∗U = {b∗U (θ1) : ∀θ1 ∈ (0.50,1.00)} and b∗L = {b∗L(θ1) : ∀θ1 ∈ (0.50,1.00)}. The wide black arrows indicate the
direction in which the boundary shifts when γ increases. The direction was shown analytically for b∗U and numerically for b
∗
L. The
following values were used to generate Figure 1: b∈ [1,700] with an increment of 0.25, c= 100, γ ∈ {0.0,0.5}, α= 1.25, p= 0.125,
q= 0.175, M = 500, K(θi) = 225
√
θi, θ1 ∈ [0.55,0.95] with an increment of 0.003125.
First, we demonstrate how the different equilibrium regions are positioned with respect to the benefit-
to-cost ratio b/c. Specifically, there exist an upper threshold b∗U(θ1) and a lower threshold b
∗
L(θ1) that
partition the parameter region into three distinct firm replacement equilibrium segments.







(D,D) if b < b∗L(θ1),
(K1,D)/(D,K2) if b∈ [b∗L(θ1), b∗U(θ1)),
(K1,K2) if b≥ b∗U(θ1).
A similar result holds with respect to the NGO’s cost factor c, with the firm replacement equilibrium
changing from (K1,K2) to (K1,D)/(D,K2) to (D,D) as c increases.
By Proposition 1, as the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c increases, the resulting firm replacement equilibrium
under the NGO’s optimal strategy changes from both firms deferring (D,D) when the ratio is low, to
either the large firm (K1,D) or the small firm (D,K2) replacing, to finally both firms replacing (K1,K2)
when the ratio is high. Within the (K1,D)/(D,K2) region, when b/c is high, the NGO is incentivized
to compel the large firm to replace to ensure a larger portion of consumers receive a replacement. As a
result, under either NGO strategy (i.e., I or R), the firm equilibrium changes from (D,K2) to (K1,D)
as the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c increases (Proposition A.1).
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With respect to market structure, we observe that b∗U(θ1) is increasing and b
∗
L(θ1) is decreasing as the
market structure shifts from a homogeneous to a dominant-firm market (Table A.4, Appendix C.1).
When the marginal environmental benefit b is high, the NGO exerts high effort to induce the large
firm to replace. However, as θ1 increases, inducing the small firm to also replace is harder due to the
small firm’s increasing average cost of replacing; i.e., K2/θ2 increases as θ2 decreases. Thus, the NGO
prefers to induce (K1,D) versus (K1,K2). Conversely, when b is low, it is too costly for the NGO to
induce the large firm to replace. As θ1 increases, the small firm is motivated to proactively replace and
gain market share from the dominant firm. Thus, the NGO prefers to induce (D,K2) versus (D,D).
We next discuss each equilibrium region in more detail and how the pragmatism of the NGO (γ)
impacts these regions.
4.1. Both Firms Defer Replacement of the Substance: (D,D)
When the firms are homogeneous in size and the benefit-to-cost ratio is very low, the NGO induces
the (D,D) equilibrium (see Figure 1). Proposition 2 demonstrates that when the induced replacement
equilibrium is (D,D), the NGO always prefers to target the regulatory body instead of the industry.
Proposition 2. Within the parameter region such that the firms’ replacement equilibrium is (D,D),
piRD,D ≥ piID,D always holds.
Although neither firm proactively replaces in this region, it is beneficial for the NGO to apply some
pressure to the regulatory body and thereby increase the likelihood that the firms are eventually forced
to replace. Note that within the R(D,D) region, due to the low environmental benefit from firms
replacing the substance, the NGO exerts either a low effort level or no effort. In addition, the size
of the R(D,D) region is increasing in γ if the small firm’s cost to proactively replace the substance
(K2) is high, as a pragmatic NGO does not want to create a significant cost burden for the small firm
(Proposition A.2). In our extensive numerical analysis, we observe that the size of the R(D,D) region
is almost always increasing in γ (Table A.5, Appendix C.1).
4.2. One Firm Replaces the Substance: (K1,D)/(D,K2)
Between thresholds b∗U(θ1) and b
∗
L(θ1), either only the large firm or only the small firm replaces the
substance. Within this region, for a wide range of parameter values, the NGO’s preferred strategy is
to target the industry and increase the market sensitivity to the substance (Lemma A.3, Proposition
A.3, and Table A.3, Appendix C.1). By increasing the market sensitivity, the NGO can leverage the
competition between firms to induce either the large firm to replace to avoid a significant loss in
market share (when b/c is high) or the small firm to replace to gain market share (when b/c is low).
Numerically, we find that targeting the regulatory body is the NGO’s preferred strategy only when the
NGO does not include the firms’ profits in its decisions (γ is low) and the existing market sensitivity
(q) is high and thus, targeting the industry is less effective (Table A.7, Appendix C.1).
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Within the (K1,D)/(D,K2) region, we observe how incorporating the firms’ profits into its decision
making can complicate the NGO’s strategy. As shown in Figure 1(a), when the NGO considers the
firms’ profits (i.e., γ > 0), equilibrium regions I(K1,D)A and I(D,K2)A can occur. Within these regions,
the NGO exerts enough effort such that it could maximize the environmental benefit. However, it
chooses to instead maximize its payoff by limiting total firm replacement costs at the expense of
inducing a lower environmental benefit. For example, within the I(K1,D)A region the NGO’s payoff-
maximizing strategy is to compel only the large firm to replace even though the NGO’s exerted effort
is sufficient to induce both firms to replace (K1,K2). Inducing I(K1,D)A enables the NGO to reduce
the total firm replacement costs, but at the same time ensures that sensitive consumers can obtain
a replacement from the large firm. Similar results hold for the I(D,K2)A region, except that in this
region the tradeoff the NGO faces is between targeting the small firm (D,K2) or the large firm (K1,D)
to replace. The I(D,K2)A region is more likely to occur when there exists a dominant firm in the
market (Proposition A.4). Conversely, the I(K1,D)A region occurs when the benefit-to-cost ratio is
higher and the firms are more homogenous in size (Proposition A.5), since inducing the small firm to
also replace (i.e., achieving (K1,K2)) incurs a high cost for the small firm when θ2 is large. When the
NGO does not incorporate the firms’ profits into its decisions (i.e., γ = 0), I(K1,D)A and I(D,K2)A
do not occur in equilibrium (Lemma A.2). This is because the NGO’s cost to induce I(K1,D)A or
I(D,K2)A is the same as that of inducing I(K1,K2) or I(K1,D), respectively; however, the latter
equilibria generate a strictly higher environmental benefit.
The I(K1,D)A and I(D,K2)A regions, which we refer to as regions of potential contention, highlight
a fundamental issue an NGO must address – whether or not to incorporate the firms’ well-being in its
decision making. A pragmatic NGO may be criticized for choosing not to maximize the environmental
benefit. By not aggressively pursuing the full or an extensive removal of the substance from commercial
use, the NGO may risk the safety of consumers and possibly damage its credibility. This finding is
consistent with Conner and Epstein’s argument that “pragmatism isn’t cheap” (2007, p. 62).
4.3. Both Firms Replace the Substance: (K1,K2)
Within the (K1,K2) region, the NGO’s optimal strategy can be to target either the industry or the
regulatory body. By Proposition 3, the choice of strategy is independent of the benefit-to-cost ratio
(b/c) and how much the NGO incorporates the firms’ profits into its decisions (γ). Instead, the NGO’s
optimal choice only depends on the market structure (θ1).









≤ piRK1,K2 for θ1 ≥ θ∗1. Also, θ∗1 is independent of b, c, and γ.
In the (K1,K2) region, both firms replace regardless of the NGO’s strategy. Thus, the environmental
benefit is the same, the firms earn the same profits, and the NGO’s choice of strategy is only determined
by which strategy requires a lower effort to induce both firms to replace. As previously discussed, due to
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the concavity of the replacement cost, the NGO’s effort level to induce (K1,K2) is driven by the small
firm’s replacement cost and market share. When the market structure is homogeneous (i.e., θ1 ≈ θ2),
the small firm can potentially lose significant market share if the large firm proactively replaces. Hence,
the NGO should target the industry to pressure the small firm to replace. However, as θ1 increases,
the small firm’s market share shrinks and using competition to induce both firms to replace becomes
less effective. Therefore, as the large firm becomes more dominant, the NGO’s optimal strategy shifts
from targeting the industry to targeting the regulatory body (see Figure 1).
Threshold b∗U(θ1) is increasing in γ and thus, the size of the (K1,K2) region is decreasing in γ
(Proposition A.6). As the NGO becomes more pragmatic, it is more concerned with the firms’ profits.
Thus, it is more inclined to only ensure that a replacement is available to consumers by inducing
(K1,D) or (D,K2) instead of (K1,K2). Conversely, if the NGO is less concerned with the firms’ profits
(i.e., γ is close to 0), then the NGO prefers to target both firms to replace, (K1,K2), if there is not a
dominant firm in the market; i.e., θ1 is not too high. If there is a dominant firm, then the less pragmatic
NGO prefers to target the industry and induce (K1,D) instead of (K1,K2) (see Figure 1(b)).
4.4. The Impact of Regulation and Market Sensitivity on the NGO’s Strategy
Finally, we examine how the NGO’s strategy changes with respect to the existing regulatory threat (α
and p) and the existing market sensitivity (q). First, when the regulatory threat increases, the effort
level the NGO must exert to induce firms to replace decreases. Thus, replacement equilibrium (K1,K2)
occurs for lower benefit-to-cost ratios, and equilibrium region (D,D) decreases in size; i.e., b∗U(θ1) and
b∗L(θ1) are decreasing in α and p (Proposition A.6 and Table A.5, Appendix C.1). In addition, only
within the (K1,K2) region does the NGO’s strategy choice highly depend on the regulatory threat.
Specifically, if the increase in threat is due to additional costs (i.e., α increases), then for a wider range
of high θ1 values, the NGO should target the regulatory body and leverage the threat of additional
costs due to regulation to induce both firms to replace; i.e., θ∗1 decreases in α (Corollary A.2). This
is particularly true if the firms’ costs to replace are high (Table A.3, Appendix C.1). If instead, the
increase in regulatory threat is due to an increase in the existing probability of regulation (p), then for
a wider range of low θ1 values, the NGO should target the industry; i.e., θ
∗
1 increases in p (Corollary
A.2). This is because the NGO’s potential to further increase the likelihood of regulation is limited;
i.e., the portion that the NGO can influence, 1− p, is small.
As the existing market sensitivity to the substance (q) increases, it becomes easier for the NGO to
induce firms to replace and hence, the (D,D) region decreases in size; i.e., b∗L(θ1) decreases in q (Table
A.5, Appendix C.1). However, whether the NGO should target a single firm or both firms to replace
(i.e., whether b∗U(θ1) is increasing or decreasing in q) depends on the pragmatism of the NGO γ and
the size of the regulation penalty α (Table A.6, Appendix C.1). If γ is low, then the size of the (K1,K2)
region is increasing in q; i.e., b∗U(θ1) decreases in q. Conversely, if the NGO is more pragmatic, then a
high existing market sensitivity implies that the resulting environmental benefit will be high as long
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as one firm proactively replaces and gains market share from its competitor. Hence, if the regulation
penalty α is high, and thus, it is easier to induce one of the firms to replace, then the pragmatic NGO
is less likely to induce (K1,K2) and b
∗
U(θ1) is increasing in q. Finally, we find that in the (K1,K2)
region, the range of θ1 values in which the NGO targets the industry shrinks as q increases (i.e., θ
∗
1
decreases in q), since the value of targeting the industry decreases as q increases; i.e., the portion that
the NGO can influence, 1− q, is small (Corollary A.2).
5. Extensions to the Base Model
Next, we analyze multiple extensions to our base model by altering our assumptions regarding com-
petition dynamics, the effectiveness of the NGO’s effort, and the firms’ replacement costs. Our results
demonstrate the impact of varying these factors on the NGO’s optimal strategy. They also show that
the insights discussed in §4 are robust and valid for a number of different scenarios.
We first examine how altering the competition dynamic can affect an NGO’s strategy when it
targets the industry. When promoting their agenda, activists often target large, visible firms within an
industry (Lenox and Eesley 2009). To capture this effect, we study a scenario where the NGO targets
only the large firm and thus, the large firm has to make its replacement decision before the small firm.
In this setting, the small firm’s potential loss in market share can vary depending on whether there is
a spillover effect from the NGO’s activism towards the large firm. We model the extent to which the
small firm incurs a potential market share loss with the parameter δ ∈ [0,1]: δ = 0 indicates that the
small firm does not incur any market loss even if it defers and the large firm replaces, whereas δ = 1
indicates that the small firm remains subject to the same potential market loss as in the base model;
i.e., it is expected to lose all of its sensitive consumers if it defers replacement.
We model the firm competition as a Stackelberg game (Appendix O.1). Lemma O.1 shows that if the
small firm is subject to the same level of market share loss as the large firm when it defers replacement
(i.e., δ= 1), then the only difference in the equilibria is that the NGO can induce (K1,D) with a lower
level of effort in the Stackelberg setting than in the base model. Conversely, when the small firm is
not subject to market share loss (i.e., δ = 0), targeting the industry is a less effective strategy for the
NGO. In particular, (K1,K2) does not occur in equilibrium and the NGO needs to exert a higher level
of effort than in the base model to induce (D,K2) or (K1,D). These findings suggest that if the NGO’s
effort towards the large firm also puts the small firm at risk of losing its sensitive consumers, then
consumers are better off in the Stackelberg setting as compared to the base model. However, if there is
no market risk for the small firm, then consumers are actually worse off as the asymmetric competition
between the firms makes it more difficult for the NGO to induce firms to proactively replace.
We next study how allowing the NGO to divide its effort to target both the industry and
the regulatory body impacts the NGO’s strategy. Under this scenario, the NGO’s effort affects the
market sensitivity and the probability of regulation, although the total effort cannot exceed 100%
(i.e., IS + 
R
S ≤ 1). We first observe that for the majority of the parameter space, the firm replacement
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equilibria that the NGO induces remain unchanged from the base model. Nevertheless, the most
significant strategy changes occur when the NGO is less pragmatic and it requires an additional source
of pressure to increase the environmental benefit; i.e., when γ and the regulation penalty α are low
(Table A.8, Appendix C.2). The less pragmatic NGO is less concerned with the firms’ profits and thus,
prefers to induce the firms to replace the substance by any means necessary. The changes in strategy
occur when the NGO attempts to induce a firm equilibrium that generates a higher percentage of the
market receiving a replacement substance. That is, the major equilibrium shifts are from (D,K2) to
(K1,D) and from (K1,D) to (K1,K2). Thus, compared to the base model, the thresholds between
equilibrium regions (e.g., the boundary between (K1,D) and (D,K2), and b
∗
U(θ1)) shift downward
when the NGO can target both the industry and the regulatory body.
Third, we examine the sensitivity of the NGO’s optimal strategy with respect to the effectiveness
of its effort for three aspects. First, the NGO’s cost factor c for targeting either party may vary.
We observe that when a strategy becomes more costly, the NGO prefers the alternative strategy for a
larger parameter region (Table A.9, Appendix C.2). However, our insights in §4 are robust to possible
errors in estimating the NGO’s cost factor. This is shown by the fact that for 90.7% of the 131 million
samples tested, the equilibria do not change, even if the NGO’s cost factor for one strategy is double
that of the other strategy. Second, the impact of the NGO’s effort on the market sensitivity or the
probability of regulation may not be 100% effective. We model this by replacing x() with xS() =wS,
where wS ∈ (0,1] and S ∈ {I,R}. We again find that when a strategy becomes less effective, the NGO
prefers the alternative strategy for a larger parameter region (Table A.10, Appendix C.2).
The third aspect regards the varying difficulty of influencing the market sensitivity or the proba-
bility of regulation for different substances. For substances where a small amount of effort can have
a significant effect, we model the impact of the NGO’s effort x() as concave in . Conversely, for
substances that require a large amount of effort to influence consumers or the regulatory body, we
model x() as convex in . We highlight three observations (Tables A.11 and A.12, Appendix C.2).
First, when the NGO’s effort has a significant impact, the region in which both firms defer (D,D)
decreases in size as it becomes easier for the NGO to induce firms to replace. Surprisingly, the region
where both firms replace (K1,K2) can shrink in size when the NGO is pragmatic. This is because
the pragmatic NGO only needs to exert a low effort to significantly increase the market sensitivity,
and thus, the environmental benefit when one firm proactively replaces and gains market share from
its competitor. Second, the I(D,K2)A and I(K1,D)A regions also increase in size when the NGO’s
impact increases. Thus, the easier it is for the NGO to influence consumers or regulation, the more of
a concern the regions of potential contention become for the NGO. Finally, when the benefit-to-cost
ratio (b/c) is low, the existing market sensitivity (q) is high, and the impact of the NGO’s effort is low,
targeting the regulatory body is used more often within the (K1,D)/(D,K2) region. Since in this case
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the NGO’s effort has less of an impact on the probability of regulation and thus, the firms’ expected
costs, a pragmatic NGO is more willing to target the regulatory body to ensure that a firm replaces.
Our next extension examines how time discounting can alter the NGO’s choice to target the
regulatory body. A firm can often realize significant savings by deferring expensive replacement costs.
For example, to control costs and to implement on their own timetables, many consumer electronics
firms set future target dates by which the implementation of replacements for potentially hazardous
substances such as phthalates and BFRs will be complete (Dell Inc. 2012, Samsung Electronics 2012).
We model this scenario by setting α< 1; i.e., the firms incur a lower replacement cost (in terms of net
present value) by deferring than by proactively replacing. We observe that targeting the regulatory
body is less effective when α < 1 as the NGO can no longer leverage the threat of regulation costs
to induce firms to replace (Table A.13, Appendix C.2). Targeting the regulatory body remains effec-
tive only when the benefit-to-cost ratio is very low and the NGO expects neither firm to replace in
equilibrium; i.e., R(D,D). Our findings suggest that given the sometimes lengthy process to regulate
a substance in the U.S., NGOs such as Greenpeace are correct in directly targeting the industry to
influence firms such as Samsung to proactively replace a substance (Williams 2010).
Finally, due to resource constraints, there may be cases where the firms’ replacement costs are
decreasing in market share; i.e., the small firm incurs a higher total replacement cost than the
large firm. To examine this setting, we model K(θ) as decreasing in θ (Appendix O.2). We highlight
three observations. First, due to its higher replacement cost, the small firm has even less incentive to
proactively replace and thus, equilibria I(D,K2) and R(D,K2) no longer occur. Instead, the potential
firm equilibria are for both firms to replace, only the large firm to replace, or both firms to defer. The
placement and structure of these equilibrium regions (with respect to θ1 and b/c), however, remains
consistent with that in the base model (Table O.1, Appendix O.2.1). Second, due to the small firm’s
high cost to replace, we observe that the (D,K2) equilibrium region in our base model is primarily
replaced by (K1,D) when the replacement costs are decreasing in market share (Table O.2, Appendix
O.2.1). Third, a change in the NGO’s optimal strategy occurs between the R(K1,K2) and I(K1,D)
regions. In particular, when there exists a dominant firm in the market, since inducing the small firm
to proactively replace is too costly, the NGO prefers to induce I(K1,D) as opposed to R(K1,K2) for
a larger parameter space than in the base model. Conversely, when the firms are homogeneous in size,
the replacement cost for the small firm is much lower, and hence the NGO prefers to induce R(K1,K2)
rather than I(K1,D) for a larger parameter space than in the base model. When the small firm faces
higher replacement costs than the large firm, the NGO should focus more on ensuring that either the
large firm proactively replaces, or if the firms are similar in size, both firms proactively replace.
6. A Firm can Lobby to Counteract an NGO’s Activism
A firm may believe that a substance is not harmful and hence, it may direct resources to either fighting
potential regulation or campaigning to educate consumers about the substance. For example, when a
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nonprofit called The Campaign for Safe Cosmetics lobbied the Colorado state legislator to prohibit
the sale of cosmetics containing potentially hazardous substances, industry leaders such as Johnson &
Johnson helped defeat the bill by counter-lobbying (Reisch 2010). Similarly, when the safety of BPA
was questioned, a group of consumer product companies, including Coca-Cola and Del Monte, devised
strategies to change consumer sentiment towards BPA (Kissinger and Rust 2009, Layton 2009). In this
section, we analyze the NGO’s optimal strategy when the large firm can lobby either consumers or the
regulatory body to counteract the NGO’s activism. We model only the large firm having the option
to lobby because often in practice only a large firm or a group of large firms have sufficient resources
to alter consumer perception or government regulation (Callahan and Roe 2012). The analysis of this
setting is detailed in Appendix O.3, with all numerical results presented in Appendix O.3.2.
To model our lobbying scenario, we update the sequence of events in §3 as follows. After the NGO
determines its strategy and effort level, the large firm then decides whether or not to lobby to offset
the NGO’s activism. If the large firm chooses to lobby, then it must determine its lobbying effort
l ∈ [0,1], with l only impacting the party that the NGO targets; i.e., consumers or the regulatory
body. We assume that its lobbying effort has a linear impact on either the market sensitivity ξ(, l)
or the probability of regulation r(, l). If the NGO targets the industry and the large firm chooses
to lobby consumers, then ξ(, l) = q + (1− q)x()(1− l) and r(, l) = p. If instead, the NGO targets
the regulatory body and the large firm lobbies against regulation, then r(, l) = p+ (1− p)x()(1− l)
and ξ(, l) = q. The large firm incurs lobbying cost cLl
2, where cL is its lobbying cost factor. After the
large firm makes its lobbying choice, the two firms then decide simultaneously whether to immediately
replace the substance or to defer replacement. Finally, with probability r(, l) regulation occurs.
Our first result shows that the large firm lobbies only when it expects to defer replacement.
Proposition 4. The large firm’s optimal strategy for when to lobby is as follows. In the equilibrium:
(a) Where both firms replace or only the large firm replaces, the large firm does not lobby.
(b) Where only the small firm replaces, the large firm always lobbies.
(c) Where neither firm replaces and the NGO exerts positive effort, the large firm always lobbies.
In addition, we observe that the regions of potential contention become less of an issue for the NGO
when the large firm can lobby. In particular, I(D,K2)A disappears (Corollary O.1) and I(K1,D)A
decreases in size (Appendix O.3.2). Within the latter region, the possibility for the large firm to lobby
causes the NGO to reduce its effort just enough such that the large firm does not lobby. Thus, the
large firm never lobbies if it expects to replace. Conversely, it always lobbies when the NGO exerts
positive effort and it expects to defer replacement; i.e., in regions (D,K2) and (D,D).
In general, the ability of the large firm to lobby does not significantly change the NGO’s strategy or
the resulting firm replacement equilibria (Table O.5, Appendix O.3.2). For example, if the equilibrium
in our base model is for the NGO to induce both firms to replace (i.e., (K1,K2)), then it remains
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the equilibrium in our lobbying scenario. This is because the potential environmental benefit and the
market structure needed to compel both firms to replace already exist. Thus, the additional threat of
the large firm lobbying does not alter the NGO’s strategy and the corresponding effort level (Corollary
O.2). In addition, for the majority of the region where the equilibrium in the base model is for only
the large firm to replace (i.e., (K1,D)), the NGO exerts either equal or lower effort in the lobbying
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Figure 2 How the Large Firm’s Ability to Lobby Impacts the Equilibria Under the NGO’s Optimal Strategy
Figure 2 demonstrates how the firms’ equilibrium strategies change compared to Figure 1(a) when the large firm can lobby.
Comparison to Figure 1(b) is similar and thus omitted. The lobbying cost factor cL = 25; all other parameters are identical to
those in Figure 1(a).
Figure 2 shows how the firm replacement equilibria under the NGO’s optimal strategy in the lobbying
scenario compare to those in the base model. We observe that lobbying has the most impact on the
firms’ and the NGO’s strategies within the parameter region where the replacement equilibrium is
I(D,K2) in our base model. In this region, the environmental benefit can actually increase since the
firm replacement equilibrium can shift from (D,K2) in our base model to (K1,D) in our lobbying
scenario. First, consider the I(D,K2) region in our base model when the benefit-to-cost ratio is low
(Region 1 in Figure 2). Within this parameter region, if the large firm can lobby, then it exerts a
significant amount of effort to influence consumers and to prove the substance is not harmful. Given
that the benefit-to-cost ratio is low, the NGO cannot easily increase the market sensitivity to the
substance and thus, it decreases its effort level. The resulting replacement equilibrium in the lobbying
scenario remains for the small firm to proactively replace the substance; i.e., I(D,K2). If instead, the
benefit-to-cost ratio is higher (Region 2), then the NGO incrementally increases its effort (compared
to our base model) in response to the possibility that the large firm lobbies. This increase in effort
increases the market sensitivity and thus, the need for the large firm to address the market risks
associated with the substance. Instead of lobbying, the large firm directs its resources to proactively
replace the substance to avoid a significant potential loss in market share; i.e., the equilibrium shifts
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from I(D,K2) to I(K1,D). Thus, by having the ability to lobby, the large firm inadvertently increases
the NGO’s activism, which in turn forces the large firm to proactively replace the substance.
The large firm exerts lobbying effort only when the marginal environmental benefit from having
a replacement is low and thus, the large firm expects to defer replacement in equilibrium. For this
case, the large firm lobbies and successfully reduces the NGO’s effort. In contrast, when the marginal
environmental benefit from replacement is high, the ability to lobby can adversely impact the large
firm as the NGO maintains and may even increase its effort to force the large firm to replace. Although
a firm lobbying consumers or the regulatory body can be costly for the NGO, it does not necessarily
reduce the environmental benefit. When the benefit-to-cost ratio is high, the NGO can still induce
either both firms or at least the large firm to proactively replace the substance.
7. Managerial Insights and Conclusion
Potentially hazardous substances are a major concern for both consumers and corporations. Today,
we are still unsure of the health and environmental impacts for an alarming number of chemicals and
substances in commercial use. The EU recognizes this problem and has taken measures with the advent
of regulation such as REACH. In the U.S., even as public awareness of and sensitivity to environmental
hazards increase, proper regulations for monitoring and controlling potentially hazardous substances
are still not in place. As Dr. Richard Denison, Senior Scientist at the Environmental Defense Fund
noted, “by failing to identify, let alone control, the long and growing list of chemicals in everyday
products that we now know can harm people and the environment, [the U.S. Toxic Substances and
Control Act] has forced states, businesses, workers and consumers to try to act on their own to address
what should be a national priority” (Safer Chemicals Healthy Families 2010). Due to this lack of
regulatory guidance, an opportunity exists for NGOs to play an influential role in setting regulatory
standards and changing firms’ substance management policies. In this paper, we study how an NGO
can influence firms to replace a potentially hazardous substance from their products. Our analysis
yields valuable insights that can guide NGOs as they make their strategic decisions.
First, we find that an NGO’s optimal strategy to compel firms to replace a potentially
hazardous substance depends heavily on the pragmatism of the NGO. If the NGO does not
significantly include firms’ profits in its decision making, then the NGO’s goal is solely to maximize
the number of consumers receiving a replacement. Hence, the NGO’s optimal strategy is often to exert
enough effort such that all firms or at least a dominant firm proactively replaces the substance (see
Figure 1(b)). Whether it should target the industry or the regulatory body is driven by the market
structure. When the market is either very homogeneous or dominated by a large firm, the NGO should
target the industry and increase the market sensitivity to the substance. By targeting the industry, the
NGO can either leverage the competition between similar-sized firms to induce all firms to replace, or
leverage the risk of a significant market share loss to compel a dominant firm to replace. Conversely,
when firms are heterogeneous in size but there is not a dominant firm in the market, the NGO should
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utilize the threat of regulation and additional replacement costs to induce all firms to replace. If
targeting a single party is not sufficient and the NGO needs additional force to achieve its desired
environmental benefit, then a less pragmatic NGO may benefit from dividing its effort to target both
the industry and the regulatory body.
As the NGO becomes more pragmatic, it increasingly incorporates the firms’ well-being into its
decision making. Thus, a pragmatic NGO’s optimal strategy is not always to maximize the number
of consumers receiving a replacement. Instead, for a wide range of benefit-to-cost ratios and market
structures, the NGO should target the industry to induce only large firms or only small firms to replace
(see Figure 1(a)). This is particularly true for substances in which a small amount of effort by the NGO
can significantly increase the market sensitivity or the probability of regulation. Only if the firms are
homogeneous in size and the environmental benefit from replacing a substance is very low or very high
should the NGO consider targeting the regulatory body. By not forcing the entire industry to replace,
a pragmatic NGO manages to limit total firm replacement costs while ensuring that a replacement is
available to sensitive consumers.
However, a pragmatic NGO must carefully weigh the tradeoff between limiting total firm
replacement costs and maximizing the environmental benefit. In attempting to appease both
consumers and firms, an NGO can create precarious decisions for itself. This is especially true when
either (i) the environmental benefit from replacement is high and the market is homogeneous, or (ii) the
environmental benefit is lower and the market consists of a dominant firm. We define these parameter
regions as regions of potential contention. Here, the pragmatic NGO faces a difficult tradeoff of whether
to increase the environmental benefit or to mitigate the firms’ costs. The critical question the NGO
must address is, to what extent it should ensure that a replacement is available to sensitive consumers.
For example, if the environmental benefit from replacement is high and the market is homogeneous in
size, then the NGO’s optimal strategy in the region of potential contention is to target large firms to
proactively replace. This strategy increases the environmental benefit while lowering small firms’ costs.
However, for the same amount of effort, the NGO could influence all firms to replace and increase the
number of consumers receiving a replacement. By not pushing for the full replacement of a substance
in the market, the NGO risks the safety of consumers and thus may damage its credibility.
Finally, we show that although a large firm’s ability to lobby either consumers or the regulatory
body often impedes an NGO’s effort, it does not necessarily reduce the expected environmental benefit.
Instead, consumers can benefit from the lobbying competition between an NGO and a
large firm. When the environmental benefit from replacement is high, the NGO does not alter its
optimal strategy and the firm does not lobby. Only when the environmental benefit from replacement is
lower can lobbying by a firm influence an NGO’s strategy. In this scenario, a large firm’s threat to lobby
can entice the NGO to increase the market sensitivity to the substance and thus, benefit consumers
by forcing the firm to replace (see Figure 2). For example, the Environmental Working Group (EWG)
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became incensed when it learned that Coca-Cola and Del Monte developed a public relations campaign
to promote the safety of BPA. In response, EWG increased its effort to raise consumer awareness and
force the firms to remove BPA from their products (Environmental Working Group 2009).
In this paper, we develop a stylized model which can be extended to study a broad range of scenarios.
A few key assumptions deserve more discussion. First, to capture the competition between firms
without over-complicating our model, we study a two-firm market. Our findings, however, can be
interpreted in the context of multiple firms. For example, the dominant-firm market structure can
represent either a multi-firm market setting with a single dominant firm or one in which a group of large
firms take collective actions. Second, we implicitly capture donor influence in the environmental benefit
component of the NGO’s objective function. This component should be positively correlated with the
amount of donations that the NGO may receive. We prefer to keep a parsimonious model regarding
donor influence due to our focus on the interaction between the NGO and the firms. However, we
acknowledge that environmental benefit and donor satisfaction may have different weights in affecting
an NGO’s action and that studying how donations impact an NGO’s decisions is an important problem
that is gaining attention in both the strategy and operations management literature. Finally, we assume
that firms do not exit the market. While replacing a substance can be costly, firms do not exit a market
if the product containing the substance is important.
There are a few aspects of our model which would benefit from further analysis. First, many industries
are working together to reduce and eliminate the risk of potentially hazardous substances. As Nardono
Nimpuno, Senior Policy Advisor at ChemSec, noted, “collaboration is increasing between downstream
users as well as across the tiers of the supply chain” (Nimpuno 2011). Analyzing a scenario in which
firms can take collective actions would generate valuable insights for integrated industries. Second,
the quality of a replacement substance may vary and it may impact consumer demand. Analyzing the
firms’ quality decisions in conjunction with their replacement strategies could provide further insights
into how competition affects the NGO’s decisions. Finally, there are two potential forms of asymmetric
information in our setting. First, due to the complex process required to replace a substance, an NGO
may not know the firms’ true replacement costs. Second, within the chemicals industry, upstream
chemical manufacturers may be more familiar with the regulatory outlook for a substance than either
NGOs or downstream manufacturers. Modeling either scenario would be beneficial.
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Appendix A: Equilibria
In this section, we discuss the detailed analysis regarding the NGO’s optimal effort level and the firms’
equilibrium replacement strategies under our base model for two scenarios: (I) the NGO targets only
the industry, and (II) the NGO targets only the regulatory body. In each scenario, we solve for the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (∗, s∗1(), s
∗
2()) defined as follows.
Definition 1. The strategy profile (∗, s∗1(), s
∗
2()) constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) if it satisfies: (a) For all i ∈ {1,2},  ∈ [0,1], and given firm -i’s strategy s∗−i(), s∗i () ∈
arg maxsi∈{K(θi),D}Πi(si, s
∗
−i()), where Πi(·, ·) is firm i’s payoff function given the two firms’ replace-
ment strategies; and (b) ∗ ∈ arg max∈[0,1] piNGO(, s∗1(), s∗2()), where piNGO(·, ·, ·) is the NGO’s payoff
function given its effort level and the resulting replacement strategies by the two firms.
Next, we analyze the SPNE in Scenarios (I) and (II). In each scenario, we first derive the firms’
equilibrium replacement strategies and then determine the NGO’s optimal effort level. We assume that
the NGO’s effort has a linear impact on ξ() and r(); i.e., x() = .
A.1. Scenario (I): The NGO Targets Only the Industry
For this scenario, we define ξ() = q+ (1− q) and r() = p in Table 2. We first analyze firm 1’s best
response given firm 2’s strategy. Note that we break the indifference point in favor of K1. We follow
the same convention for firm 2. Given that s2 =K2, firm 1’s best response is s1 =K1 if ≥ (K1(1−
αp)−Mθ1q)/(Mθ1(1− q)), and s1 =D otherwise. Given that s2 =D, firm 1’s best response is s1 =K1
if ≥ (K1(1−αp)−Mq)/(M(1−q)), and s1 =D otherwise. Similarly, given that s1 =K1, firm 2’s best
response is s2 =K2 if ≥ (K2(1−αp)−Mθ2q)/(Mθ2(1−q)), and s2 =D otherwise. Given that s1 =D,
firm 2’s best response is s2 = K2 if  ≥ (K2(1− αp)−Mq)/(M(1− q)), and s2 = D otherwise. Since
θ1 ∈ [1/2,1], θ1 ≥ θ2, and K(θ) is concave and increasing in θ, we know that K2/θ2 ≥K1/θ1 ≥K1 ≥K2.
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Note that for all four firm equilibria to possibly arise, we need (K2(1−αp)−Mq)/(M(1− q))> 0 and
(K2(1− αp)−Mθ2q)/(Mθ2(1− q))< 1. These conditions are equivalent to Mq <K2(1− αp)<Mθ2.
To focus on the most interesting scenario where all four cases can occur in equilibrium, we will assume
in the subsequent analysis that this condition holds.
We also note from Equation (4) that, when  ∈ [(K1(1 − αp) −Mq)/(M(1 − q)), (K1(1 − αp) −
Mθ1q)/(Mθ1(1−q))), both (D,K2) and (K1,D) can arise as the firms’ equilibrium replacement strate-
gies. To resolve the issue of multiple equilibria, we follow the refinement concept of risk dominance
developed by Harsanyi and Selten (see, e.g., Harsanyi and Selten 1988, Harsanyi 1995) to find the
condition under which one of the two equilibria is selected. For (K1,D) to risk dominate (D,K2),
the collective loss of deviating from (K1,D) must be higher than the collective loss of deviating
from (D,K2). Mathematically, this is given by (Π1(K1,D) − Π1(D,D))(Π2(K1,D) − Π2(K1,K2)) ≥
(Π1(D,K2) − Π1(K1,K2))(Π2(D,K2) − Π2(D,D)). Simplifying this inequality, we have (K1,D) risk
dominates (D,K2) if ≥ [(K1θ1−K2θ2)(1−αp)−M(θ1−θ2)q]/[M(θ1−θ2)(1− q)]. We next show that
K1 < (K1θ1−K2θ2)/(θ1−θ2)<K1/θ1 if K(θ) is concave and increasing in θ. When θ1 > θ2, the inequal-
ity holds because K1 >K2 and K2/θ2 >K1/θ1. When θ1 = θ2 = 1/2, we have limθ→1/2[K(θ)θ−K(1−
θ)(1− θ)]/[θ− (1− θ)] =K(1/2) +K ′(1/2)/2 by L’Hoˆpital’s rule. Since K(θ) is increasing, K(1/2) +
K ′(1/2)/2 > K(1/2). Since K(θ) is concave, K(0) < K(1/2) + K ′(1/2)(0 − 1/2), i.e., K ′(1/2)/2 <
K(1/2) with K(0) = 0. Thus, K(1/2) +K ′(1/2)/2< 2K(1/2) and the strict inequality remains.


































To derive the NGO’s optimal effort level which maximizes its payoff, we consider four cases in
Equation (5). In Case (D,D), the NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = bp(1 − q)(1 − ) +
γ[M(1− q)(1− )− αp(K1 +K2)]− c2. Therefore, the NGO’s optimal effort level in Case (D,D) is
ID,D = 0, where the superscript denotes the case of the NGO targeting the Industry, and the subscript
denotes the corresponding firm replacement equilibrium. Now consider Case (D,K2). The NGO’s payoff
function is given by piNGO() = b [(1− p)((q+ (1− q))θ1 + θ2) + p] + γ[M − αpK1 −K2] − c2. Note
that dpiNGO()/d= b(1− p)(1− q)θ1 − 2c and d2piNGO()/d2 =−2c < 0. Hence, piNGO() is strictly
concave in  in Case (D,K2), and the optimal effort level 
I
D,K2
is achieved at either the solution to
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In addition, we slightly abuse the notation by using ID,K2 to denote only the interior solution.
Formally speaking, IAD,K2 should be equal to [(K1θ1−K2θ2)(1−αp)−M(θ1−θ2)q]/[M(θ1−θ2)(1−q)]
minus an infinitesimal number since the value of  falls in an interval that is open on the right (see the
second line of Equation (5)). We report it as the boundary value to avoid unnecessary complexity in
our notation. We use I(D,K2)A to denote the I(D,K2) equilibrium achieved at the upper-boundary
solution. This equilibrium is based on the ε-equilibrium concept, which is a slight relaxation of Nash
equilibrium. One can verify that an SPNE exists if we adopt mixed strategies at the boundary between
I(D,K2) and I(K1,D) rather than breaking the tie in favor of I(K1,D). However, we prefer to use
ε-equilibria to focus on pure strategies because mixed strategies are often difficult to interpret. The
use of ε-equilibria is common in the literature; see, e.g., Mailath et al. (2005) and Radner (1980).
Next consider Case (K1,D). The NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = b[(1− p)(θ1 + (q +
(1 − q))θ2) + p] + γ[M − K1 − αpK2] − c2. Note that dpiNGO()/d = b(1 − p)(1 − q)θ2 − 2c and
d2piNGO()/d
2 = −2c < 0. Hence, piNGO() is strictly concave in  in Case (K1,D), and the optimal




























In addition, we slightly abuse the notation by using IK1,D to denote only the interior solution. Similarly,
the I(K1,D)A equilibrium follows the ε-equilibrium concept. We highlight I(K1,D)A and I(D,K2)A
in Figure 1(a) as they represent the regions of potential contention for the NGO.
Finally, consider Case (K1,K2). The NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = b + γ(M −
K1 −K2) − c2. Hence, the NGO’s optimal effort level in Case (K1,K2) is IK1,K2 = (K2(1 − αp) −
Mθ2q)/(Mθ2(1− q)). To eventually derive the SPNE for this scenario, we shall compare the NGO’s
payoff under its optimal effort level in the above four cases and analyze the conditions under which each
case arises in equilibrium. We omit the detailed algebra and conditions here. Instead, we summarize
the following lemmas regarding conditions that exclude certain cases in the comparison.
Lemma A.1. If the firm equilibrium I(K1,D) is achieved at either the interior or the upper-boundary
solution, then I(D,K2) must be achieved at the upper-boundary solution.
Lemma A.2. If γ = 0, then (a) I(D,K2)A is dominated by I(K1,D)B, and (b) I(K1,D)A is domi-
nated by I(K1,K2).
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A.2. Scenario (II): The NGO Targets Only the Regulatory Body
For this scenario, we define r() = p+ (1− p) and ξ() = q in Table 2. With a similar equilibrium
analysis as in §A.1 and using the refinement concept of risk dominance, we can obtain that the firms’


































Note that for all four firm equilibria to possibly arise, we need (K2(1− αp)−Mq)/(αK2(1− p))> 0
and (K2(1−αp)−Mθ2q)/(αK2(1− p))< 1. Given assumptions Mq <K2(1−αp)<Mθ2 in §A.1 and
α≥ 1, the two conditions hold. Thus, we again focus on the most interesting scenario where the above
four cases can occur in equilibrium.
To derive the NGO’s optimal effort level which maximizes its payoff, we consider four cases in
Equation (8). Case (D,D): The NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = b(p+ (1− p))(1− q) +
γ[M(1−q)−α(p+(1−p))(K1 +K2)]− c2. Note that dpiNGO()/d= b(1−p)(1−q)−γα(1−p)(K1 +
K2)−2c and d2piNGO()/d2 =−2c < 0. Hence, piNGO() is strictly concave in  in Case (D,D), and the
optimal effort level RD,D is achieved at either the solution to the first-order condition or the boundaries


















Hereafter, we use RAD,D to denote the upper-boundary solution.
Case (D,K2): The NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = b[p+ (1− p)+ (1− p)(1− )(qθ1 +
θ2)]+γ[M−α(p+(1−p))K1−K2]−c2. Note that dpiNGO()/d= b(1−p)(1−q)θ1−γα(1−p)K1−2c
and d2piNGO()/d
2 =−2c < 0. Thus, piNGO() is strictly concave in  in Case (D,K2), and the optimal




























In addition, we slightly abuse the notation by using RD,K2 to denote only the interior solution.
Case (K1,D): The NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = b[p+ (1− p)+ (1− p)(1− )(θ1 +
qθ2)]+γ[M −K1−α(p+(1−p))K2]− c2. Note that dpiNGO()/d= b(1−p)(1−q)θ2−γα(1−p)K2−
Kraft, Zheng, and Erhun: The NGO’s Dilemma 25
2c and d2piNGO()/d
2 = −2c < 0. Hence, piNGO() is strictly concave in  in Case (K1,D), and the




























In addition, we slightly abuse the notation by using RK1,D to denote only the interior solution.
Case (K1,K2): The NGO’s payoff function is given by piNGO() = b+ γ(M −K1−K2)− c2. Hence,




To derive the SPNE for this scenario, we shall compare the NGO’s payoff under its optimal effort
level in the above four cases and analyze the conditions under which each case arises in equilibrium. We
omit the detailed algebra and conditions here. Instead, we summarize the following lemma regarding
the exclusion of certain cases in the comparison.
Lemma A.3. (a) R(D,D)A is dominated by R(D,K2)B.
(b) R(D,K2)A is dominated by R(K1,D)B.
(c) R(K1,D)A is dominated by R(K1,K2).
(d) If R(K1,D) is achieved at the interior solution, then R(D,K2) is dominated.
Appendix B: Summary of Additional Theoretical Results
Lemma A.4. If αpK2 +Mθ2q ≥K2, then, regardless of whether the NGO targets the industry or
the regulatory body, the NGO’s optimal effort level is = 0 and both firms replace in equilibrium.
Proposition A.1. Given the NGO’s targeting strategy N where N ∈ {I,R}, there exists a unique
threshold bNM(θ1) such that (K1,D) is induced if b≥ bNM(θ1) and (D,K2) is induced if b < bNM(θ1).








is the NGO’s optimal
effort level when the R(D,K2) equilibrium is achieved at the lower-boundary solution.
Proposition A.3. When I(K1,D) is achieved at the interior solution, it dominates R(K1,D) and
R(K1,D)B, where the subscript B indicates the equilibrium is achieved at the lower-boundary solution.
Similarly, when I(D,K2) is achieved at the interior solution, it dominates R(D,K2) and R(D,K2)B.
Proposition A.4. When K(θ) = kθa with a ∈ (0,1) or K(θ) = k − k exp{−βθ} with β ∈ (0,2],
I(D,K2)A occurs for large values of θ1.
Proposition A.5. I(K1,D)A occurs for small values of θ1. As b increases, the largest value of θ1
at which I(K1,D)A occurs is higher.
Within the I(K1,D)A region, if the NGO’s optimal strategy to induce (K1,K2) is to target regulation,
then for a lower effort level the NGO could induce both firms to replace by targeting regulation.
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Thus, for regions in which piIAK1,D >pi
R
K1,K2




Proposition A.6. b∗U(θ1) is decreasing in α and increasing in γ.
Corollary A.2. θ∗1 is decreasing in α and q, and increasing in p.
Appendix C: Numerical Analysis
Next, we present the results of the numerical analysis for §4 and §5. We eliminate cases in which
K2 ≤ αpK2 +Mθ2q in our analysis.
C.1. Should the NGO Target the Industry or the Regulatory Body?
Summary of the NGO’s Strategy: As shown in the last row of Table A.3, the NGO targets the
industry in 64.0% of all cases tested and the regulatory body in the remaining 36.0%. The NGO’s
choice of which party to target is mostly influenced by the firms’ replacement costs and the regulation
penalty. This is especially true within the (K1,K2) region. For example, when the firms’ replacement
costs and the regulation penalty are high (see row α ≥ 2 in the middle panel of Table A.3), within
the (K1,K2) region the NGO’s preferred strategy is to target the regulatory body and leverage the
threat of additional costs to induce R(K1,K2). We observe that in this case, R(K1,K2) occurs in 45.9%
of all cases tested whereas I(K1,K2) only occurs in 0.2% of all cases. Conversely, when the firms’
replacement costs and the regulation penalty are low (see row 1≤ α< 2 in the top panel of Table A.3),
the NGO’s preferred strategy is to target the industry and utilize the competition between firms to
induce I(K1,K2). We observe that, R(K1,K2) only occurs in 9.9% of all cases tested whereas I(K1,K2)
occurs in 50.9% of all cases. The additional analysis with k ∈ {75,150} was performed to highlight the
impacts of the replacement costs and the regulation penalty on the NGO’s strategy.
Table A.3 NGO Strategy by Replacement Cost and Regulation Penalty
Low Replacement Cost: k ∈ {75,150}
α I(D,K2) I(K1,D) I(K1,K2) I Total R(D,D) R(D,K2) R(K1,D) R(K1,K2) R Total Total
1≤ α< 2 294,180 3,612,756 5,408,800 9,315,736 133,475 2,033 123,884 1,056,906 1,316,298 10,632,034
2.8% 34.0% 50.9% 87.6% 1.3% 0.0% 1.2% 9.9% 12.4% 100.0%
α≥ 2 188,325 1,863,871 2,075,680 4,122,876 84,095 1,236 24,336 3,735,470 3,845,137 7,968,013
2.3% 23.4% 26.1% 51.7% 1.1% 0.0% 0.3% 46.9% 48.3% 100.0%
Total
477,505 5,476,627 7,484,480 13,438,612 217,570 3,269 148,220 4,792,376 5,161,435 18,600,047
2.6% 29.4% 40.2% 72.3% 1.2% 0.0% 0.8% 25.8% 27.7% 100.0%
High Replacement Cost: k ∈ {225,300,375,450}
α I(D,K2) I(K1,D) I(K1,K2) I Total R(D,D) R(D,K2) R(K1,D) R(K1,K2) R Total Total
1≤ α< 2 9,204,033 15,180,940 1,722,630 26,107,603 1,782,679 76,880 943,673 7,509,630 10,312,862 36,420,465
25.3% 41.7% 4.7% 71.7% 4.9% 0.2% 2.6% 20.6% 28.3% 100.0%
α≥ 2 5,579,322 8,692,780 48,088 14,320,190 1,141,835 22,954 264,664 13,359,400 14,788,853 29,109,043
19.2% 29.9% 0.2% 49.2% 3.9% 0.1% 0.9% 45.9% 50.8% 100.0%
Total
14,783,355 23,873,720 1,770,718 40,427,793 2,924,514 99,834 1,208,337 20,869,030 25,101,715 65,529,508
22.6% 36.4% 2.7% 61.7% 4.5% 0.2% 1.8% 31.8% 38.3% 100.0%
Total
15,260,860 29,350,347 9,255,198 53,866,405 3,142,084 103,103 1,356,557 25,661,406 30,263,150 84,129,555
18.1% 34.9% 11.0% 64.0% 3.7% 0.1% 1.6% 30.5% 36.0% 100.0%
Note: Parameter values shown are the number of occurrences for each equilibrium given the α and k value ranges.
How b∗U(θ1) and b
∗
L(θ1) Change With θ1: As shown in Table A.4, for almost all cases, b
∗
U(θ1)
increases in θ1 and b
∗
L(θ1) decreases in θ1. Thus, the size of the (K1,D)/(D,K2) region is almost always
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L(θ1) with respect to θ1 are
found by comparing whether, for a given parameter set, the benefit-to-cost ratio (b/c) corresponding to
the threshold increases or decreases when we increment θ1 to the next value in the numerical sample.
All future comparative static results are obtained in a similar manner.
Table A.4 Comparative Statics of Thresholds b∗U(θ1) and b
∗
L(θ1) with Respect to θ1
Threshold Inc/Dec No. of Cases θ1 p α q γ b k
b∗U(θ1) Increasing 385,385 0.74 0.24 1.92 0.24 0.32 285.7 323.1
b∗U(θ1) Decreasing 3,826 0.74 0.09 2.26 0.11 0.31 368.9 398.4
b∗L(θ1) Increasing 156 0.63 0.28 1.47 0.03 0.28 99.4 315.4
b∗L(θ1) Decreasing 330,403 0.73 0.20 1.47 0.13 0.53 84.22 359.3
Note: Parameter values shown are averages.
How b∗U(θ1) and b
∗
L(θ1) Change with p, α, q, and γ: As shown in Table A.5, for almost all cases,
b∗U(θ1) and b
∗
L(θ1) decrease in p and α, and b
∗
L(θ1) decreases in q and increases in γ. As shown in Table
A.6, how b∗U(θ1) changes with q depends on the regulation penalty (α), the pragmatism of the NGO
(γ), the marginal environmental benefit (b), and replacement cost (k).
Table A.5 Comparative Statics of Thresholds b∗U(θ1) and b
∗
L(θ1) with Respect to Model Parameters
Threshold Parameter No. of Cases Decreasing Increasing
b∗U(θ1) p 355,300 96.4% 3.6%
b∗U(θ1) α 380,485 99.9% 0.1%
b∗L(θ1) p 320,772 94.0% 6.0%
b∗L(θ1) α 317,002 100.0% 0.0%
b∗L(θ1) q 333,558 100.0% 0.0%
b∗L(θ1) γ 280,081 0.1% 99.9%
Note: Tests for α and γ are included to complement the proofs of Proposition A.2 and A.6.
Table A.6 Comparative Statics of Threshold b∗U(θ1) with Respect to q
Threshold Inc/Dec No. of Cases θ1 p α γ b k
b∗U(θ1) Increasing 171,533 0.76 0.20 2.21 0.42 365.2 343.6
b∗U(θ1) Decreasing 177,045 0.70 0.28 1.64 0.21 225.4 305.6
Note: Parameter values shown are averages.
The NGO’s Strategy Within the (K1,D)/(D,K2) Region: As shown in Table A.7, the NGO
targets the industry in 96.7% of all cases tested. Equilibria R(K1,D) and R(D,K2) occur when the
NGO does not significantly incorporate firms’ profits in its decision making (i.e., γ is close to 0) and
the existing market sensitivity q is high (also see Figure 1(b)). Note, we assume the NGO prefers to
target the regulatory body when the NGO is indifferent between the two strategies. For many of the
R(K1,D) and R(D,K2) cases, we find that the NGO obtains the same payoff by targeting the industry.
Table A.7 NGO’s Strategy Within the (K1,D)/(D,K2) Region
Payoff Increase No. of Cases % θ1 b p α q γ k
I(K1,D) 23,873,600 59.7% 0.78 367.4 0.25 1.73 0.28 0.62 324.0
I(D,K2) 14,783,480 37.0% 0.76 248.6 0.16 1.74 0.28 0.71 383.5
R(K1,D) 1,210,580 3.0% 0.87 228.7 0.19 1.52 0.38 0.02 365.3
R(D,K2) 99,834 0.3% 0.74 18.5 0.18 1.51 0.33 0.00 382.3
Note: Parameter values shown are averages.
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C.2. Extensions to the Base Model
Due to computational constraints, for the extensions of the NGO targeting both parties (Table A.8)
and the NGO’s effort being less than 100% effective (Table A.10), we adjust our parameter set as
follows: θ1 ∈ [0.55,0.95] with an increment of 0.0125, b ∈ [1,700] with an increment of 10, c = 100,
p ∈ [0.025,0.525] and q ∈ [0.025,0.525] with an increment of 0.0625 for both, and α ∈ [0.50,3.00] with
an increment of 0.50. All other extensions are analyzed with the same parameter set as in §3.
The NGO Targets Both the Industry and the Regulatory Body: To test how the NGO’s
strategy changes if it can allocate its effort between parties, we compare our results in §4 with the
case in which the NGO can target both the industry and the regulatory body. While in some cases,
targeting one party may reduce the cost of targeting the second party, we test a worst-case scenario
and do not alter the NGO’s cost factor; i.e., the NGO’s total cost of effort is c(IS)
2 + c(RS )
2. As shown
in Table A.8, the option of targeting both parties has the biggest impact on the NGO’s strategy when
the NGO is less pragmatic. The largest shifts occur when the NGO attempts to increase the expected
percentage of the market receiving the replacement substance. For example, the less pragmatic NGO
targets (K1,D) instead of (D,K2) and (K1,K2) instead of (K1,D) at the parameter regions that form
the boundaries between these equilibria in the base model. In addition, we observe that when the NGO
can target both parties, it incurs the highest increase in payoff (as compared to the base model) at the
parameter regions that form the thresholds between equilibrium regions under the base model; i.e., at
b∗U(θ1), the boundary between (K1,D) and (D,K2), and b
∗
L(θ1).
Table A.8 Firm Equilibria Shifts When the NGO Targets Both Parties
Orig. EQ Target Both EQ No. of Cases % of All Cases (γ > 0) α γ
(K1,D) (K1,D) 1,315,400 37.1% 1.70 0.59
(K1,K2) (K1,K2) 1,128,035 31.8% 2.08 0.23
(D,K2) (D,K2) 834,604 23.5% 1.70 0.71
(D,D) (D,D) 183,713 5.2% 1.73 0.70
(K1,D) (K1,K2) 53,420 1.5% 1.25 0.26
(D,K2) (K1,D) 14,656 0.4% 1.42 0.24
Total 3,529,828 99.6% 1.81 0.50
Note: The top six occurring cases are presented. Percentages are with respect to the total number of cases, 3,544,210. Parameter
values shown are averages.
The Impact of the NGO’s Effort Level: We test how varying the effectiveness of the NGO’s
effort impacts the NGO’s strategy by relaxing three assumptions: (i) the NGO’s cost factor c is the
same for targeting the industry and the regulatory body; (ii) the NGO’s effort is 100% effective; and
(iii) the NGO’s impact is linear in its effort level. To test these cases we let (i) cI ∈ {100,200} and
cR ∈ {100,200}; (ii) xS() =wS with wS ∈ {0.50,0.75,1.00} for S ∈ {I,R}; (iii) x() =
√
 and x() = 2.
First, as shown in Table A.9, when a strategy becomes more costly to the NGO, it is less used by
the NGO; i.e., the NGO changes to the other strategy. Nevertheless, the equilibria do not change for
90.3% of all cases tested (over 131 million). Thus, our insights in §4 are robust to possible inaccuracies
in estimating the NGO’s cost factor.
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Table A.9 Equilibria Shifts When the NGO’s Strategy Becomes More Costly
Orig. EQ New EQ (cI , cR) No. of Cases % of All Cases
I(K1,D) R(K1,K2) (200,100) 2,592,200 2.0%
I(K1,K2) R(K1,K2) (200,100) 1,130,000 1.0%
I(K1,D) R(K1,D) (200,100) 1,145,040 0.9%
R(K1,K2) I(K1,D) (100,200) 2,860,050 2.2%
R(K1,K2) I(K1,K2) (100,200) 1,997,700 1.5%
R(K1,D) I(K1,D) (100,200) 785,339 0.6%
All Cases 12,773,534 9.8%
Note: The top six occurring cases are presented. Percentages are with respect to the total number of cases, 131,049,407.
When the NGO’s effort is not 100% effective, we find that the number of consumers receiving a
replacement declines. Specifically, when (wI , wR) decreases from (1.0, 1.0) to (0.5, 0.5), we observe a
22.3% increase in the number of I(D,K2), R(D,D), and R(D,K2) cases, and a 16.9% decrease in the
number of I(K1,K2) and R(K1,K2) cases. In addition, we observe from Table A.10 a decrease in the
NGO’s choice of the less effective strategy compared to the base model.
Table A.10 NGO Strategy When Targeting the Industry or the Regulatory Body Becomes Less Effective
wI wR Target the Industry % of Cases Target the Regulatory Body % of Cases
0.5 1.0 6,080,826 44.6% 7,558,014 55.4%
1.0 0.5 10,923,360 80.1% 2,715,579 19.9%
1.0 1.0 8,615,718 63.2% 5,023,034 36.8%
Note: Parameter values shown are the number of cases.
To analyze how our results change with a nonlinear NGO impact, we first test how b∗U(θ1) and
b∗L(θ1) change when the NGO’s effort shifts from having a low impact (i.e., x() = 
2) to having a high
impact (i.e., x() =
√
). For 97.3% of the 253,421 b∗L(θ1) samples, b
∗
L(θ1) decreases (i.e., the size of
the R(D,D) region decreases) as we shift from x() = 2 to x() =
√
. Only when the existing market
sensitivity is high, and thus, targeting the industry is less effective in the (K1,D)/(D,K2) region, do
we observe cases in which b∗L(θ1) increases. For b
∗
U(θ1), as shown in Table A.11, if the NGO does not
significantly incorporate the firms’ profits into its decision making, then as the impact of the NGO’s
effort increases, b∗U(θ1) decreases (in 60.9% of the 373,602 b
∗
U(θ1) samples). Thus, the less pragmatic
NGO induces (K1,K2) for lower benefit-to-cost ratios. If instead, the NGO is more pragmatic, then
b∗U(θ1) can increase as the NGO does not target both firms to replace when the firms’ costs are high.
Table A.11 How Threshold b∗U(θ1) Changes as the Impact of the NGO’s Effort Increases
b∗U (θ1) No. of Cases % of Cases γ α k
Decreasing 227,547 60.9% 0.19 1.84 320.6
Increasing 146,055 39.1% 0.53 2.23 339.5
Total 373,602 100% 0.32 1.99 328.0
Note: Parameter values shown are averages.
Regarding the regions of potential contention, we test how the size of the I(K1,D)A and I(D,K2)A
regions (i.e., the range of b/c values when these equilibria are achieved) change as the impact of the
NGO’s effort changes. We find that the regions of potential contention are increasing in size as the
impact of the NGO’s effort increases. Specifically, in 92.7% of the 386,699 I(D,K2)A cases, the size
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of the region increases when the NGO’s effort has a higher impact; similarly, in 95.4% of the 184,075
I(K1,D)A cases the size of the region increases.
Finally, we test how a nonlinear impact alters the NGO’s optimal strategy. As shown in Table A.12,
most changes to the NGO’s strategy occur in the (K1,D)/(D,K2) region. In particular, when the
impact is high (i.e., concave), targeting the industry is almost always the NGO’s preferred strategy in
this region (98.6% of the 40,786,315 (K1,D)/(D,K2) cases). In contrast, when the impact is low (i.e.,
convex), targeting the regulatory body is used more often (42.5% of the (K1,D)/(D,K2) cases). This
is especially true when the existing market sensitivity is high and the benefit-to-cost ratio is low.
Table A.12 Equilibrium Comparison for High vs. Low Impact
EQ (High Impact) EQ (Low Impact) Cases b θ1 p α q γ k
R(K1,K2) R(K1,K2) 16,957,000 447.5 0.72 0.23 2.14 0.23 0.22 335.57
I(K1,D) I(K1,D) 13,467,245 434.4 0.77 0.22 1.67 0.21 0.62 329.1
I(K1,D) R(K1,D) 8,945,875 290.9 0.80 0.28 1.85 0.42 0.66 317.3
I(D,K2) I(D,K2) 7,856,003 342.1 0.77 0.12 1.74 0.25 0.74 401.0
I(D,K2) R(D,K2) 5,015,879 106.5 0.78 0.20 1.75 0.35 0.69 362.7
R(D,D) R(D,D) 2,366,459 63.5 0.71 0.18 1.76 0.10 0.73 371.5
Note: Parameter values shown are averages. 54,608,461 of 65,529,524 cases tested are shown.
The Effect of Time Discounting (α< 1): To model this scenario we define α< 1 as a time discount
factor; i.e., firm i’s cost for not being ready for regulation αKi is less than its cost to proactively replace
Ki in net present value terms. As shown in Table A.13, when α= 2.0, the NGO targets the regulatory
body for 47.7% of all cases tested; when α= 0.5, the NGO targets the regulatory body for only 10.8%
of all cases. Note that the positioning of the equilibria (i.e., Proposition 1) continues to hold.
Table A.13 The Impact of a Time Discount Factor on the NGO’s Strategy
% of Cases
α I(D,K2) I(K1,D) I(K1,K2) R(D,D) R(D,K2) R(K1,D) R(K1,K2) Ind Reg
0.5 4,258,390 4,176,790 412,480 879,404 88,931 101,418 0 89.2% 10.8%
1.0 3,080,280 4,599,000 627,820 565,113 33,456 317,010 551,330 85.0% 15.0%
1.5 1,999,746 3,543,000 368,690 402,010 13,529 203,384 2,464,600 65.7% 34.3%
2.0 1,405,157 2,279,480 41,801 287,534 7,116 91,424 3,013,400 52.3% 47.7%
Note: Values shown are the number of occurrences for each equilibrium given the associated α value.
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